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CoRPoRAnoNs-SHAREs oF SToCK-R:aAsoNABLENEss oF REsTRicnON ON
OF SHAREs-Defendant corporation's by-laws provided, inter alia, that
shareholders wishing to dispose of their shares must, in absence of contrary
agreement with the remaining sharehoiders, give latter an option to buy at a
price equal to book value, regardless of market value of these shares. This restriction was not set forth in the share certificates as required by statute.1 On
refusal of defendant corporation to permit transfer of its shares except in compliance with the terms of the by-law, complainants brought suit for declaratory judgment, and obtained a finding that these terms were void. Held, affirmed.
TRANSFER

1 Ala.

Code (1940) tit. 10, §62.
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The by-law restriction violated the statute and also constituted an unreasonable
restriction on transfer, since, although it gave the other shareholders the right
to purchase at book value, it did not givC:;_ the vendors a corresponding power
to compel purchase at this price. Security Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Carlovitz,
(Ala. 1949) 38,S. (2d) ~74.
In absence of restraints of their alienation, shares of stock are as freely
ferable as other personalty. 2 Valid restraints on transfer may arise either from
statute, charter, by-law, or express agreement among the shareholders. Transfer
of shares can properly be prevented by statute,3 although some jurisdictions may
find unduly severe statutory restrictions void as unreasonable and therefore
contrary to public policy.4 Charter restrictions on transfer are upheld, unless
palpably unreasonable, on the ground that shareholders buy shares· subject to
such res~ctions, and in effect agree to them. 5 By-laws may properly impose restrictions of a formal nature on transfer of shares, for example, by requiring that
transfers be made in a particular way to enable the corporation to ascertain the
identity of its shareholders.6 Though a corporation may not, through a by-law
and in absence of statutory authority, completely preclude the transfer of shares,7
and though courts look with disfavor on substantive restraints on stock transfers
and construe them strictly,8 most courts hold that a corporation may, through a
by-law, impose reasonable subst~tive (as distinguished from formal) restrictions
on transfer, when convenient to attainment of corporate purposes and not viola- ·
· tive of statute. 9 Though many courts hold that without specific legislative permission no restrictions can be imposed by means of a by-law, most courts manage
to find at least implied permission from the corporation statutes.10 The Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, now in effect in most states, by requiring that all restrictions be set forth in the certificates themselves, implicitly authorizes reasonable
restrictions.11 Although there is a conffict as to whether or not the corporation
may, in absence of statute, require the selling shareholder to give the corpora.:
tion or its remaining shareholders a purchase option at market value,12 the majority

trans-

2

12 FLETCHER, CYc. CcRP., perm. ed., §5452 (1932).
Howe v. Roberts, 209 Ala. 80, 95 S. 344 (1923).
·4 Morgan v. ~truthers, 131 U.S. 246, 9 S.Ct. 726 (1889); Ireland v. Globe Milling Co.,
19 R.I. 180, 32 A. 921 (1895).
5 Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 1, 147 A. 312 (1929). Cf. Green
v. E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A. (2d) 249 (1938), noted in 37 MxcH. L.
Rl!v. 1140 (1939).
_ 6 Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 34 A. 1127 (1896).
7 Howe v. Roberts, supra, note 3.
8 In re Starbuck's Estate, 129 Misc. 460, 221 N.Y.S. 540 (1927).
9 Lawson v. Household Finance Corporation, supra, note 5.
10 Nicholson v. Franl;lin Brewing Co., 82 Ohio St. 94, 91 N.E. 991 (1910). See 65
A.L.R. 1159-63 (1930).
116 Uniform Laws Annotated §15 (1922).
12 See Bloede v. Bloede, supra, note 6, which holds that this option may not be required.
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view is that such an option may be insisted upon.13 However, the corporation
may not make the right to transfer dependent on the approval of a particular
corporate offi.cial.14 It is true that a corporation can, through agreement among
its shareholders duly suppqrted by consideration, obtain broader restrictive powers than it can create through a by-law. It clearly can contract for a purchase
option-even in jurisdictions not otherwise permitting such options except by
statute15-and for other restrictions on transfer not properly the subject of by-law.16
In fact, any agreement not void, as in restraint of trade or otherwise against public
policy, can be enforced. The tendency is to validate such agreements if they do·
not contravene public policy, on the ground that they are within proper contract
powers.17 However, in the instant case, lack of mutuality of the option provision
was said to preclude reliance upon it as an express agreement, as well as to
render it unreasonable and violative of statute. In view of the limitations imposed by most courts on the right to restrict transfer of shares through by-laws,
it would seem that the court's conclusion in the principal case is sound and
amply supported by precedent.18

E. Blythe Stason, Jr.

13 See 8 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., §4205 (1932), and Nicholson v. Franklin
Brewing Co., supra, note 10.
·14 Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co., 25 Mass. 90, 19 Am. Dec. 306 (1829).
15 Hoberg y. McNevins, 169 Wis. 486, 173 N.W. 221 (1919).
16 Nat. Bank of the Pacific v. Western Pac. R. Co., 157 Cal. 573, 108 P. 676 (1910);
New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N.E. 432 (1894).
17 Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me. 34, 145 A. 391 (1929).
18 See BALLANTINE, CoRPoRATIONs, §336 (1946).

